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The information and communication society has gone through major and unexpected 
developments over the past decade, which raise new social, economic and legal issues. The 
impact of new technology on research, teaching, access to culture and to information, the 
transmission of knowledge - all key elements of UNESCO’s mandate - is unprecedented. 
One of the essential challenges presented by what has come to be referred to as the 
information society is that of building a balanced and coherent legal framework that takes 
account of the change in the economic and sociocultural model while at the same time 
safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms in the digital world. Copyright is one of the 
stones in this edifice, and is probably one of the foundation stones. Content in the digital age 
will to a great extent be made up of works claiming copyright protection. However, the 
digitization and circulation of works over networks such as the Internet means that low-cost, 
high-quality copies can be made quickly, and these copies can also be sent to many other 
people around the world, irrespective of borders. Furthermore, digital works are easily altered, 
or even falsified, which means that there are many potential threats to the moral right of 
authors. Given these facts, it is not surprising that copyright is one of the first areas to have 
attracted the attention of the international community. 
Both national and international legislative and technological initiatives were soon 
designed to reinforce copyright protection in this new environment.1 As early as 1996, the 
international community was presented with two treaties signed under the aegis of WIPO, 
whose goal was to deal with the primary concerns of authors. National and regional 
legislators also passed laws to this effect. 
Nevertheless, this reinforcement of copyright runs the risk of causing an unprecedented 
break in the balance inherent in all systems of intellectual property.2 For copyright relies on 
balancing the interests of protecting created works and their creators and guaranteeing public 
interest and fundamental freedoms.3 This balance derives precisely from one of the basic 
principles of copyright, which is to promote progress in the arts and sciences and to spread 
culture. All copyright systems are generally based on the following foundations and goals, 
even if the relative importance of a given goal may vary in a given legal system: 
- the necessity of remunerating creators: copyright is the indispensable remuneration 
for the creator’s work, allowing her or him rightfully to enjoy the fruits of the labour 
that created the work; 
                                                 
1  WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaties, signed in Geneva on 
20 December 1996; Digital Millennium Copyright Act (United States), October 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (adding §§ 512 and 1201-1203 to the Copyright Act of 1976); 
Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, COM (1999) 250 final of 21 May 1999; 
OJ 1999, C180/6. 
2  LEGAL ADVISORY BOARD, Replies to the Green Paper of the European Commission on Copyright 
and Neighbouring Rights in the Information Society, 1995. 
3  HUGENHOLTZ, P.B., “Fierce creatures-Copyright exemptions: Towards extinction?”, in Rights, 
Limitations and Exceptions: Striking a Proper Balance, IFLA/IMPRIMATUR Conference, Amsterdam 
30-31 October 1997, available at<http://www.imprimatur.acls.co.uk/IMP_FTP/exptfonu.pdf>, pp. 5-6. 
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- encouraging creation: copyright in theory allows the production of works of added 
intellectual value to be furthered by giving creators the assurance that the goods they 
create are protected (thus ensuring profitability and therefore providing a stimulus for 
creative investment). In this way, the supply of this type of goods and their 
appropriate distribution is enhanced; 
- copyright is an instrument of cultural policy that is also designed to support and 
regulate the spread and movement of ideas and of culture. So considered, authors’ 
rights and the limitations on those rights are the two levers of this policy. 
As a result, all copyright coverage grants a monopoly to the creator based on a 
compromise between creators’ interests and “the interests of society at large, which demand 
the free movement of ideas, information and commercial exchange”.4 Inherent therein is the 
idea of a social contract between the creator and society.5 
Many copyright principles embody this concern for balance.6 Thus, both the length and 
the extent of copyright are limited. More fundamentally, the definition of the concept of a 
work that may be protected through the criterion of originality is an essential instrument in 
drawing a line between what is protected and what belongs to the public domain. The doctrine 
of the dichotomy between the idea and the expression of a work, only the latter being 
protectable, is also a result of this concern for balance. Finally, users are granted several 
exemptions which convey the need for preserving such essential values as freedom of 
expression, the right to privacy, access to information and to culture and the dissemination of 
knowledge through education, research and access to libraries. 
 This balance is nevertheless threatened by technological and legislative changes that 
have been enacted by the information society. Copyright is expanding, not only as regards the 
items protected but also as regards the area of protection. The period covered by copyright has 
recently been increased in many countries, notably in Europe and in the United States, 
from 50 to 70 years after the creator’s death. Basic information, traditionally outside the scope 
of copyright, becomes indirectly covered by the sui generis right on databases. 
Exceptions to and limitations on copyright, an essential means of striking the right 
balance, are liable to decrease, both through the effects of the law and through the growing 
use of contracts and of technology in applying copyright. Keeping a balance between 
copyright and access to information is, and will remain, a major challenge to the Information 
Society. The threats to the transfer of knowledge and access to informational and cultural 
content are considerable. UNESCO has a major role to play in this debate. 
The issue of copyright in the information society is complex and has spawned an over-
abundance of legislation at both international and national levels. This study sets out to 
describe the main current developments in copyright and their implications for access to 
information in order to provide a tool for understanding what is essentially at stake and in 
what ways UNESCO might be usefully involved. 
                                                 
4  B. EDELMAN, Une loi substantiellement internationale. La loi du 3 juillet 1985 sur le droit d’auteur et 
les droits voisins, in J.D.I., 1987, p. 571. 
5  A. LUCAS and H.J. LUCAS, Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, Litec, 1994, p. 41. 
6  HUGENHOLTZ, op cit., p. 6. 
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Within this framework, the study foregrounds three main principles which, in keeping 
with the above-mentioned concern for balance, may serve as guidelines for States in adapting 
copyright to the digital age. 
1. Copyright must not be an instrument for widening the gap between industrial and 
developing countries. Quite the contrary: the information society is an excellent 
opportunity for the latter, and the legal instruments governing that society, foremost 
among which is copyright, must take care not to deprive developing countries of the 
advantages of access to technology and information. 
2. Access to information and knowledge are the two basic principles underlying the 
creation and development of the Information Society and of electronic networks. The 
digital age cannot deny its roots and must therefore continue to benefit education, 
research and the transmission of knowledge. 
3. The protection of creators is crucial to the dissemination of knowledge and culture. 
Insofar as this protection is threatened on digital networks, it must be adequately taken 
into account. It is, however, right to take into account not only the legitimate interests of 
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1. FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO INVESTMENT PROTECTION:  
THE CASE OF DATABASE PROTECTION 
(a) Current situation and issues: the protection of databases by a sui generis right 
In recent years, new objects and subjects of rights have appeared in the area of intellectual 
property. From the rights recognized as pertaining to producers of phonograms and 
videographic recordings to the sui generis right on databases, new rights related to copyright 
have emerged. These new rights are evidence of a disturbing change in intellectual property 
rights which has gone from a system supposed to protect creative works to a system tending 
to protect investments. Thus, the producer of a phonogram or of a first print of a film has been 
given a right similar to copyright because of the investment she or he has put into producing 
or making the record or film. Radio stations have been granted similar rights because of the 
investment required by their broadcasts. And it is also the investment inherent in gathering 
information that has justified recognizing a right to intellectual property for the producers of 
databases. 
This change contradicts the very foundations of intellectual property rights and 
particularly of copyright, which are designed to protect an intellectual work with a view to 
promoting progress in the arts and sciences.7 Similar rights and the sui generis right of the 
producer of databases stray from these foundations, because it is admitted outright that their 
reason for existing is the will to ensure a “return” on investments through a monopoly.8 
In Europe, the creation of a new monopoly on databases relies on a 1996 European 
directive,9 whereby copyright protection, which covers the original architecture of the 
database, is supplemented by a protection of the content itself. Indeed, the sui generis right 
allows the database producer to prohibit retrieval and reutilization of material from it for a 
15-year period. The only criterion for protection is the need for a substantial quantitative or 
qualitative investment in obtaining, checking or presenting the contents of the database.10 
“The deployment of financial resources and/or the expending of time, effort and energy”11 
thus replaces, within the framework of the sui generis right, the criterion of originality 
implicit in copyright. Merely gathering information in one place is henceforth enough to make 
a database monopolizable by virtue of an intellectual property right. The substantial 
investment criterion will have to be determined by the courts and tribunals. In any case, it 
may include hiring staff to set up the database and to gather data.12 
Furthermore, it will be noticed that this newly created right, which enables its holder to 
control and therefore prohibit access to information itself, has been granted virtually as a right 
in perpetuity, since the initial 15-year period of protection, starting from the date of 
                                                 
7  A. STROWEL, Droit d’auteur et Copyright, Bruylant, 1993, pp. 256 et seq. 
8  M. BUYDENS, La protection de la quasi-création, Bruylant, Brussels, 1993. 
9  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, O.J. N°L 77/20 March 1996. 
10  Article 7, §1 of the Directive. 
11  Preambular paragraph 40 of the Directive. 
12  Civ. Brussels (cess.), 16 March 1999, J.T. 1999, p. 305. 
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production, is renewed each time a substantial change in the database is made. It is therefore 
enough to update the database regularly to get another 15-year extension.13 
The United States is also discussing the possibility of enacting precisely such 
extravagant copyright protection.14 WIPO had to give up similar international protection at 
the 1996 Diplomatic Conference, notably because of opposition from developing countries.15 
Passing a law to protect databases outside copyright, either by a sui generis right as in 
Europe or by any other mechanism designed to cover the contents in a database, has kindled 
much criticism. Two main kinds of reproach may be made regarding this new kind of 
intellectual property right: one may object, on the one hand, that the criterion for protection is 
an economic investment rather than an intellectual act and, on the other, that the right on 
databases allows for a de facto appropriation of informational content itself, which is liable to 
be an obstacle to the dissemination of, and access to, information. 
These two consequences of database protection are harmful mainly to developing 
countries in the educational and scientific sectors, since in practice it entails setting up an 
economic barrier to all access to information. 
1. Intellectual property as a mechanism for return on investment 
Protecting products such as databases by an intellectual property right that is based only on 
the criterion of the investment required for their material production is contrary to the 
fundamental logic of intellectual property, whose conditions are normally based on qualitative 
factors such as creation and originality for copyright and invention and innovation for patent 
rights and for design and model rights. For a monopoly to be granted on the sole basis of an 
investment and economic risk-taking profoundly changes the balance between protection and 
public domain. As Pollaud-Dullian has written: “the notion of public domain is consubstantial 
with that of industrial and artistic property: only certain objects may, because they are original 
or new, be appropriated. This leaves a vast area of unprotected elements that are necessary to 
creators, inventors, scientists and industrialists. (...) the directive [on databases], while 
attempting to share out the recognition of rights in such a way as to take these interests into 
account, strays from these principles, and (...) undermines the very conception of industrial or 
artistic property by setting up a right that concerns (...) elements which cannot normally be 
                                                 
13  A. STROWEL, La loi du 31 août 1998 concernant la protection juridique des bases de données, J.T., 
1999, p. 299.  
14  The United States is discussing two instruments, one providing protection similar to the European 
sui generis right, the other applying the doctrine of misappropriation to the protection of database content. 
H.R. 354 “Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”; H.R. 1858 “Consumer and Investor Access to 
Information Act”. The two bills are being discussed by two different committees which do not at present 
seem ready to make any concessions. 
15  Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, Geneva, 
2-20 December 1996, analytical reviews (in plenary meetings) by the International Bureau, particularly 
Nos. 417, 426, 435, 461 and 465, as well as the African Group position. 
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covered either by copyright, in the absence of originality, or by an intellectual property right, 
in the absence of innovation.”16 
Such a change in the idea of intellectual property “woven around the idea that it and the 
monopolies it thus grants are not trade-offs for enriching the collective cultural heritage, but a 
bonus that the law gives to companies which are able to make sizeable investments (which 
comes down to giving them a legal privilege as a reward for a de facto economic one)”17 is 
particularly disturbing for developing countries and companies in those countries which very 
often cannot afford to make such investments.  
The granting of an exclusive right on investment such as the one achieved by this 
disturbing development in the concept of intellectual property cannot fail to strengthen the 
economic position of those who can already afford to invest. 
2. Protecting databases: impeding access to information 
The second argument used to counter the passage of this new sui generis right, both at 
European level and during the WIPO discussions, concerned the constitution of exclusive 
rights over information itself, which is in theory non-appropriable. In principle, the 
sui generis right does not cover an individual piece of information or datum whose retrieval 
or reutilization could be prohibited. The right covers, rather, the whole collection of data. 
Strowel and Triaille point out that “base content” covered by the sui generis right is “not the 
information itself, contained in the databases, but rather ‘the non-original form’ of the whole 
of the information, which, not being original, cannot be protected by copyright and at the 
same time needs to be protected from being unfairly used by a third party”.18 
This sui generis right nevertheless amounts, in reality, to granting a monopoly over a 
simple collection of information, thus threatening public access to the information. The threat 
will be particularly real when the whole of the data can only take the shape that the producer 
of the database gives it. This will be true, for example, of public transport timetables, 
television programme schedules,19 tide charts, weather reports, etc. Accessing this data 
requires accessing the database proposed by those who collect the data. Giving the latter a 
legal monopoly over the base amounts to giving them a de facto monopoly over its content. 
Setting up a monopoly over information through the sui generis right on databases not 
only jeopardizes access to information by developing countries, but also prevents the non-
commercial sector from taking advantage of the free flow of information. The educational and 
scientific communities, whose work is inconceivable without the permanent use of available 
information, is particularly affected by this new right. 
                                                 
16  POLLAUD-DULLIAN, Brèves remarques sur la directive du 11 mars 1996 concernant la protection 
juridique des bases de données, Dall. Aff., 1996, p. 539. See also LUCAS, A., Droit d’auteur et 
numérique, Droit@Litec, 1998, p. 46 No. 89: “We have contrived to reduce copyright to a mechanism for 
return on investment, at the risk of losing sight of the fact that, even if an objective approach is taken to 
originality, copyright implies a minimum of creativity”. 
17  BUYDENS, “Le nouveau régime juridique des bases de données”, op cit. p. 9.  
18  A. STROWEL and J.P. TRIAILLE, Le droit d’auteur, du logiciel au multimédia, Cahiers du CRID, 
N°11, Bruylant, 1997, p. 322. A. KOUMANTOS, “Databases in the Community Directive”, R.I.D.A., 
January 1997, p. 118. 
19  See the European Court opinion in the Magill case.  
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(b) Discussion: protecting databases outside the scope of intellectual property 
Creating a new intellectual property right protecting databases is not only subject to criticism, 
it is also legally unnecessary. Producers of databases are not without legal means of 
sanctioning any appropriation of the work they put into gathering and organizing data. If the 
database displays originality in the choice and structure of the content, this will, of course be 
protected by copyright in accordance with the 1996 European Directive, the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and the TRIPS agreements. 
Furthermore, common law offers certain means of redress through law covering unfair 
competition. Using law pertaining to unfair competition as a system to protect databases was 
discussed when the 1996 European Directive was being drawn up. In fact, the original idea 
was to use the law on unfair competition to prohibit the appropriation of effort and investment 
made by the database producer. This solution is based on the theory of parasitic competition, 
which sees as unfair the fact that a competitor can save herself or himself the trouble of 
financial effort by slavishly copying other people’s work and thus gain an illicit competitive 
advantage. The merit of this option is that it limits the possibilities of legal action to cases of 
slavish and systematic copying of the efforts of a producer of databases, and furthermore 
confers the right to take legal action only against competitors (as opposed to users). This 
system thus avoids the risk of a monopoly on information. 
The creation of an intellectual property right protecting databases is not, therefore, a 
legal necessity. 
(c) Recommendations 
1. Intellectual property, and a fortiori literary and artistic property, protects 
work of a creative character. It is not intended to protect an investment. 
2. The protection of databases is adequately guaranteed by the set of rules 
governing copyright and unfair competition. The creation of a sui generis 
right, designed to limit, or resulting in the limitation of, access to information 
by third parties is contrary to the fundamental principles of intellectual 
property and violates the world community’s right of access to information. 
  
10 
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2. THE FUTURE OF EXCEPTIONS OR EXEMPTIONS IN THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 
(a) Current situation: exceptions to and limitations on copyright 
Systems of copyright exemption differ according to legal frameworks. A closer look at them 
nevertheless allows us to deduce that they are generally of two kinds: they are said to be open 
when they provide for a general waiver applicable to many situations, patterned on the 
American concept of fair use. And they are said to be closed when they are made up of a list 
of narrowly defined circumstances in which authors’ rights do not come into play. The latter 
system is found mainly in the legislation of continental Europe.20 
The American system of fair use is an example of an open system insofar as certain 
uses, normally raising a question of copyright, may be considered by the judge to fall within 
the framework of this general exemption, in view of the purpose and the nature of the use 
(notably if the use is of a non-commercial nature or for teaching purposes), the nature of the 
protected work, the quantity and substantial nature of the portion of the work used, and the 
effect of the use on the potential market or the effect of the use on the value of the protected 
work.21 This system allows a certain flexibility in the evaluation of copyright exemptions, 
although it does not guarantee that users of the works are legally safe or that the outcome of 
their using the works will be legally predictable. 
On the other hand, in the European or European-style system of copyright, mainly laws 
of French and German origin, the exemptions consist of a precise and exhaustive list of acts 
which, in certain circumstances, circumvent the author’s monopoly. The following 
exemptions are generally recognized:22 
-  exemption for copying for personal or other private use; 
-  exemption for private communication, e.g. within the family; 
-  exemption for parody, pastiche or caricature; 
-  exemption for quotation; 
-  exemption for copying for scientific or teaching purposes; 
-  exemption for news reporting; 
-  exemption required by the needs of the administration of justice and public policy. 
Next to these broad categories of exemption, we also find very specific cases regarding 
particular situations. For example, there is the Belgian exception which allows the 
                                                 
20  P. SIRINELLI, Exceptions et limites aux droit d’auteur et droits voisins, Workshop on Implementation 
Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT), Geneva, 6-7 December 1999. 
21  Article 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.  
22  For a thorough description of exceptions in various countries, see Les Frontières du droit d’auteur: ses 
limites et exceptions, ALAI Study Days, 14-17 September 1998, Cambridge, Ed. Australian Copyright 
Council, 1999. 
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Cinémathèque Royale to make copies of films for purposes of restoration, or the German 
exception which exempts the communication of works during liturgical ceremonies. 
(b) Issue: towards a reduction in the number of exemptions in the digital environment? 
Adapting exemptions to the digital environment is an essential issue. Right-holders are 
demanding that their implications and scope be reconsidered so that the new digital society 
cannot jeopardize their prerogatives. 
The 1996 WIPO Treaties recall in this connection the necessity of providing for a 
general limit to the number of exemptions granted by the national laws of the Contracting 
Parties. Article 10 of the Copyright Treaty imposes a limit on exemptions, both on copyright 
and related rights, and on special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. This is the principle of 
the three-step test already included in the Berne Convention and in the TRIPS (ADPIC) 
Agreement.23 According to Article 10 of the Copyright Treaty: “Contracting parties may, in 
their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to 
authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author”. 
This threefold condition, designed as the touchstone of the system of exceptions and 
“one of the foundations for future frameworks”24 will thus serve as a guideline in evaluating 
copyright exemptions. 
These three conditions or “steps” are as follows: first of all, only exceptions that are 
included in special cases are accepted. General exemptions are therefore prohibited, such as, 
for example, a general exception for private use.25 However, fair use, while potentially a 
broad limitation,26 does not seems to be prohibited by this provision. 
The other two conditions (that there be no conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or prejudice to the author’s legitimate interests) must be considered within the context 
of each exception. If the contested exception enables a third party to exploit the work in such 
a way as to compete with the copyright holders, or if applying the exception affects the 
potential market for the work, it cannot be accepted.27 
The Agreed Statement accompanying the WIPO Copyright Treaty specifies that: “the 
provisions of Article 10 [the three-step test] permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national 
laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these 
                                                 
23  Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement: “Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights 
to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right-holder”. 
24  P. SIRINELLI, op.cit., p. 6.  
25  S. RICKETSON, “International conventions and treaties”, in Les Frontières du droit d’auteur: ses limites 
et exceptions, ALAI Study Days, 14-17 September 1998, Cambridge, Ed. Australian Copyright Council, 
1999, p. 10. 
26  Cf. the analyses of the principal commission during the WIPO Treaty negotiations. 
27  P. SIRINELLI, op.cit., p. 46.  
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provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and 
limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment. It is also understood that 
Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and 
exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention”. 
In spite of its ambiguous and complex articulation, the Statement confirms that the 
three-step test may not have the effect of either reducing or extending the list of exemptions in 
the digital environment. Thus, States may indisputably come up with new exceptions which 
would be acceptable in the Information Society.28 Simultaneously, Article 10 itself 
necessitates a rereading, using the three-step test29 as a yardstick, of the existing exemptions 
with a view to their transposition to the digital environment.30 
In any event, the current trend seems to be to reduce both the scope and the number of 
exceptions to copyright in the digital world. This was the idea behind the proposal in the 
European Directive on Copyright in the Information Society, which limits exceptions to a few 
narrowly and exhaustively defined cases in which provision is usually made for payment of 
fair remuneration to the author. Nevertheless, the ambitious plan for harmonization failed to 
meet its goal in that the latest version of the text, then at the stage of the common position,31 
allows States to choose among a list of 22 exemptions (!). Even the private digital copy 
remains in this long list, in spite of the determination of copyright holders to eliminate this 
possibility of copying in the digital environment because of the ease of doing so and the high 
quality of the copy. 
Reducing the scope of exemptions in the digital age is also the result of recent American 
case law limiting fair use in the light of the technological possibilities now open to the author. 
We have seen that the benefit of fair use depends on how four factors are taken into 
account, and notably that of the influence of the contested use on the work’s potential market. 
In the American Geophysical Affair,32 the judge ruled that the existence of the Copyright 
Clearance System, encompassing authors and publishers who electronically grant permission 
to make photocopies of articles taken from books or newspapers, constituted a market for 
photocopies of scientific articles, so that photocopies made by a company for its research 
department could no longer be considered as falling within the area of fair use. It may be 
feared that this case law rules out use for scientific or educational purposes, hitherto 
considered legitimate, on the sole pretext that signing licensing contracts for this kind of use 
is henceforth technologically and economically possible. 
                                                 
28  A. FRANCON, “The Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions”, 
RIDA, April 1997, pp. 36-39. 
29  P. SIRINELLI, op.cit., p. 46. 
30  S. RICKETSON, op cit., p. 20. 
31  The common position of 8 June 2000 is the latest version of the text of the European Directive. The text 
had not been published at the time of completing this report. 
32  American Geophysical v. Princeton University Press, 60 F. 3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S. 
Ct. 592 (1995). P. GOLDSTEIN, “Pre-empted State Doctrine, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory 
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright”, UCLA Law Review 1977, 24, p. 1139. PALLAS LOREN, L., 
“Redefining the market failure approach to fair use in an era of copyright permission systems”, J.I.P.L., 
Vol. 5, 1999, available at http://www.lawsch.uga.edu/~jipl/vol5/loren.html.  
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One of the terms of the three-step test in the WIPO Treaties - i.e. the absence of conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work - could well support such a ruling. This criterion is 
similar to one of the terms on which the concept of fair use is based, i.e. the influence of the 
use on the potential market of the work covered, or on its value. In the American Geophysical 
Affair, the disputed test ended with the rejection of the fair use argument because the 
application of this exception violated the normal exploitation of the work insofar as it was 
possible to negotiate the authorization by contractual and technological means. 
As a result, the criterion of normal exploitation of the work as an absolute limit to the 
exception implies a decrease in exemptions in cases where technology makes it possible to 
negotiate the use previously authorized by claiming an exception, following the example of 
the above-mentioned American ruling. This legal trend, supported by the three-step test, is 
liable to bring about a sea-change in existing exemptions. Some authors33 predict, for 
example, that as technological developments will permit an easy contractualization of 
relationships over the Internet, each use of the work could be negotiated and licensed. The 
need to specify exceptions in law thus becomes insignificant. Let us suppose that an author 
distributes her or his work over the Internet while at the same time contractually allowing 
quotation from it for scientific purposes for a small fee. If we take the American ruling to its 
logical conclusion, we could argue that because the author has created a potential market over 
the Internet for this type of use normally covered by an exception by making it easy to sign a 
contract for this purpose over the Internet, the appeal to fair use is ruled out. Likewise, can the 
legislation still include this kind of exception if the use of the contractual model becomes 
more widespread? Could such an exception, which would circumvent potential negotiation 
with the copyright holder, not be considered an infringement of the normal exploitation of the 
work? 
(c) Solution: exemptions as a fundamental principle of copyright 
Exemptions are key factors in striking the right balance between authorial and public interest 
under copyright systems. They take into account not only exceptions to rights but also, within 
the area of copyright, fundamental freedoms and major societal interests.34 Freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press and the right to information underlie certain limitations on 
copyright. Thus, for example, exemptions concerning private use are designed to protect 
individual privacy, while exemptions for teaching and research purposes seek to guarantee the 
right of peoples to knowledge and education.  
Several consequences will derive from this eminent justification for copyright 
exemptions: 
                                                 
33  W. FISHER III, “Property and contract on the Internet”, 1998, available at: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ipcoop/98fish.html. T. BELL, “Fair use v. fared use: The impact of 
automated rights management on copyright’s fair use doctrine”, 76 N.C.L. Rev. (1998), p. 101. 
34  LEGAL ADVISORY BOARD, Replies to the Green Paper of the European Commission on Copyright 
and Neighbouring Rights in the Information Society, 1995. P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, “Fierce creatures -
Copyright exemptions: Towards extinction?”, in Rights, Limitations and Exceptions: Striking a Proper 
Balance, IFLA/IMPRIMATUR Conference, Amsterdam, 30-31 October 1997, available at: 
http://www.ivir.nl  
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1. Exemptions must be maintained in the digital environment for the sake of the inherent 
balance of copyright 
The issue of adapting exemptions to the digital environment can be solved only through a 
fresh analysis of the basis on which exemptions are granted. The doctrine35 generally quotes 
two kinds of consideration to justify imposing a limitation on copyright: either the exception 
is required for practical or economic reasons, or it is justified by concerns of general interest 
or fundamental rights or freedoms. Here we use Hugenholtz’s three-pronged distinction:36 
• First, some exemptions express through copyright the concern to guarantee 
fundamental freedoms,37 such as freedom of expression, information, freedom of the 
press and the right to privacy. These exemptions are: parody, quotation, critical 
reviews, news reporting or, again, private use of the works. It goes without saying 
that the justification for these limitations does not change in the digital environment. 
Consequently, these exemptions must be protected and preserved. 
• The second category of exemption is justified by requirements of public interest.38 
These are exemptions limited to education and libraries, archives and museums, the 
disabled and the needs of justice and the State. Here, too, the interests providing a 
basis for the exemptions continue to be found in the digital environment. This is 
particularly the case in the educational and scientific community in that an increasing 
number of works and items of information are available only on the Internet. So it is 
particularly important for researchers and students in the scientific community to 
enjoy the same opportunities in the digital environment and in the analogue world. 
Presumably, existing exemptions in favour of libraries, the scientific and educational 
communities ought to be maintained in the environment of electronic networks.  
However, applying these exemptions is in some cases totally different and is 
thus liable to interfere in a new way with the normal exploitation of the work. The 
parties who benefit from these exemptions, such as libraries or the teaching 
profession, take on radically new roles in the Information Society.39 A virtual library 
open to the global public 24 hours a day is essentially different from a physical 
institution whose users and opening hours are limited. The boundary between the 
publisher or distributor of information and works and the library of the future is 
tenuous. Likewise for institutions offering correspondence courses. Henceforth, even 
if one must support keeping exemptions already included in this framework, that will 
not obviate the need to think through the roles and function of libraries and education 
on the Internet. Thinking this issue through could also bring to light the need for new 
exemptions in order to preserve the fundamental value of access to culture and the 
transmission of knowledge. 
                                                 
35  P. SIRINELLI, op. cit.; A. LUCAS, Droit d’auteur et numérique, op cit., pp. 175 et seq.; SPOOR, J., 
“General aspects of exceptions and limitations: general report”, in Les Frontières du droit d’auteur: ses 
limites et exceptions, ALAI Study Days, 14-17 September 1998, Cambridge, Ed. Australian Copyright 
Council, 1999, p. 33.  
36  HUGENHOLTZ, “Fierce creatures”, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
37  L. GUIBAULT, “Limitations found outside copyright law”, in Les Frontières du droit d’auteur: ses 
limites et exceptions, ALAI Study Days, op. cit., p. 43. 
38  Ibid, p. 45. 
39  J. SPOOR, op cit., p. 40. 
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• Finally, some exemptions have been introduced into the legislative arsenal of 
copyright to compensate either for a market failure or for an inability on the part of 
authors effectively to control and prevent certain uses. This applies to private 
audiovisual copying and reprography. When devices for graphic, audio or 
audiovisual reproduction were developed, such as photocopiers, VCRs and tape 
recorders, the number of copies of works also skyrocketed. The author could not 
effectively control all such copies, particularly when the copy was made for private 
use. Given that impossibility, law-makers generally recognized the user’s right to an 
exemption for private copying accompanied by payment of a fee to the author. This 
type of exception is thus a concession to the practical impossibility of enforcing 
copyright. Technological developments now mean that it is no longer an 
impossibility. Through technological mechanisms, the author can prevent others 
from making digital copies. As a result, a great deal of the justification for the 
exemption vanishes. Furthermore, these exemptions pertain neither to a fundamental 
freedom nor to a concern for public interest. Their existence is therefore directly 
threatened. 
Maintaining the inherent balance of copyright argues at least for keeping existing 
exemptions. In certain cases, one might even argue that, given the extension of exclusive 
authorial rights, the scope of exemptions must be enlarged so as to redress the balance.40 
Rights and exceptions are in fact inextricably involved in striking that balance. Until now, 
law-makers have thought only of extending exclusive authorial rights. It is time to give equal 
consideration to the interests of users. 
2.  New limitations on copyright may be recognized on the basis of fundamental freedoms 
It is generally accepted that, given their very nature, exemptions must be strictly interpreted, 
so that not only may new ones other than those stipulated by law not be recognized, but what 
these exemptions themselves actually cover is also to be narrowly interpreted. On the other 
hand, recognizing that these exemptions are an essential part of copyright, based on a balance 
between private and collective interests, ought to mean accepting that jurisprudence must be 
able to extend the list of what is covered by the exemptions included in the law when a 
situation arises which jeopardizes this balance between competing interests. 
Some rulings have actually done so outright. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
considered that the logic of copyright itself entailed that the list of exemptions featured in 
copyright law could not be considered exhaustive.41 According to this ruling, exemptions 
included in the law are the result of a compromise between the author’s legitimate interests on 
the one hand and the interests of third parties or of society on the other. It may be logically 
deduced from this that when the ratio legis that has justified exemptions is found in a similar 
situation (i.e. when the general interest or higher interest of a third party can only be 
preserved by limiting copyright) it must be accepted that the author’s rights must give way to 
this general interest or third party interest in seeing the work reproduced and/or made 
available to others. 
                                                 
40  LEGAL ADVISORY BOARD, Replies to Green Paper, op. cit. 
41  Dior v. Evora, Hoge Raad, 20 October 1995, N.J., 1996, N° 682.  
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It is interesting to note that this line of thinking is echoed in France, where copyright 
has always been subject to narrow interpretation. Thus, in a ruling on 23 February 1999,42 the 
Regional Court of Paris recognized the user’s right to an exemption unprovided for by 
copyright law on the basis of the public’s right to information as laid down in Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. French television broadcast a programme on an 
Utrillo exhibition. Some of the artist’s paintings were shown on the programme, but such 
reproductions are not allowed by French law. The conditions of the exemption for brief 
quotations were not considered to be met. Nevertheless, the judge held that, given the public’s 
right to information, a programme showing a work by an artist, broadcast solely on a short 
news programme, will not infringe the intellectual property rights of others, for it will be 
justified by the right of television viewers to be quickly and appropriately informed about a 
cultural event relating to the work or its author that is currently in the news, and that it will 
not compete with the normal exploitation of the work. 
Other European rulings43 have struck a similar balance between copyright and 
fundamental freedoms, chiefly freedom of expression, in order to recognize the user’s right to 
an exemption unforeseen by copyright law.  
Does the position adopted by European courts tend towards implicit recognition of the 
fact that the legal list of copyright exemptions is not exhaustive? The assertion that further 
limitations on copyright may be allowed when the balance between the author’s interests and 
those of the public so demands would mean a real swing in judicial doctrine towards a new 
balance in the realm of copyright. 
3. The emergence of a market from technological development is not enough to set aside 
an exemption 
We saw above that recent American case law and an overly narrow reading of the WIPO 
Treaties’ “three-step test” could lead to the denial of an exemption where technology makes it 
possible for the contested use to be negotiated. In this opinion, the exemption is viewed as a 
mere concession by the author, who finds herself or himself practically unable to exercise a 
right (market failure). One theory justifies this disappearance of the exemption by citing the 
development of a suitable infrastructure for electronic commerce which could generally 
reduce the costs of granting licences. 
Asserting that the exception to copyright is not based on market failure but is rather an 
essential part of the necessary compromise between private and public interests regarding 
copyright is an appropriate and obvious answer to this threat. Because limitations on 
exclusive rights represent society’s interests as opposed to the author’s, technological 
developments behind the emergence of new markets must have no bearing on such 
limitations. 
As a result, both judge and law-maker, when they find an exemption to be appropriate 
or acceptable, must take into account the basic justifications for the exception and not merely 
                                                 
42  Dalloz 1999, 581, note Kereva, R.I.D.A., April 2000, p. 374. 
43  Terroristenbild, Landgericht Berlin, 26 May 1977, G.R.U.R., 1978, p. 108; P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, 
“Copyright and freedom of expression in Europe”, to be published in ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUS, 
HARRY FIRST & DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN (eds.), Innovation policy in an information age, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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the technological or economic possibility that the author has of granting her or his permission 
to use the work. 
(d) Recommendations 
1. The importance of exemptions within the copyright system must be reasserted. 
Exemptions are an essential part of the necessary compromise between private 
and public interests regarding copyright and are an appropriate and obvious 
answer to this threat. So considered, they are not only exceptions to the rights 
but express the acknowledgement within the area of copyright of fundamental 
rights and freedoms and higher interests of the global community. 
2. Exemptions must be maintained in the digital environment in order to preserve  
the fundamental balance enshrined in copyright. 
3. Exemptions based on fundamental freedoms or on considerations of public 
interest must continue to exist in the Information Society, or even be adapted to 
that specific environment. Access to information, research and the transmission of 
knowledge and culture may justify the introduction of new exceptions to and 
limitations on copyright as well as the extension of existing exceptions. 
4. Exemptions relating to education and research must be maintained in the digital 
environment. The role of education and libraries in the digital environment must 
be a subject of debate. If necessary, existing exceptions should be extended within 
the limits of the three-step test in order to allow correspondence courses and 
digital libraries to play a role in the Information Society. 
5. The legislative list of exceptions to copyright may be supplemented by the decision 
of the courts on the basis of fundamental freedoms in special cases. Further 
limitations on copyright may be recognized when the balancing of the author’s 
and public interests so demands. This recognition establishing a precedent must 
be made, however, with due regard for the 1996 WIPO Treaty’s three-step test. 
6. Enjoyment of exemptions cannot be denied on the pretext that a potential market, 
notably one that has been introduced through technology, could contractualize 
such enjoyment, particularly when the exemption is based on the exercise of 
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3.  THE USE OF CONTRACTS AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PROTECTION  
OF COPYRIGHT 
The information society forces industries to move quickly towards a distribution framework 
based on network communication which guarantees the security of their products. In addition 
to copyright, whose effectiveness is undermined on electronic networks, copyright holders 
and other distributors of works are starting to rely on at least two kinds of protection: 
contracts and technological devices.44 
The association of contracts and technology in the distribution of works is a serious 
threat to the institution of copyright itself. Some people predict that contract law, combined 
with technology, could make copyright law obsolete.45 
3.1  Contract and copyright 
(a) Current situation and implications: the emergence of electronic licences 
Because it is interactive, the Internet is especially adapted to licensing transactions between 
copyright holders, producers, intermediaries and end-users. Some distributors of works, such 
as software companies or database producers, have already been developing business models 
based on such licensing transactions with users for a number of years. This kind of model is 
coming to include works in their totality, in a context of convergence where every cultural 
product is now liable to be converted to and distributed in digital format.46 
In the physical world, it is in fact rather rare for an individual user to enter into the 
formal ties of a contract licence when she or he decides to use a work (of course, there are 
subscription contracts offered by producers, but the question of their acceptability by the user, 
and therefore of their validity, poses a problem). On the other hand, on digital networks, it is 
highly likely that electronic licences will become the rule. Whether it is a question of 
newspapers, music, information contained in a database, software or books, access to cultural 
content and information will be made with a mere click, which will simultaneously indicate 
consent to a licensing contract. There are mouse-click, click-through or click-wrap 
contracts.47 
These contracts are liable to upset the balance of copyright by getting around some of 
its rules, e.g. by forbidding the user’s exercise of an exemption that is nevertheless recognized 
by law. The author of a software program could thus contractually prohibit someone from 
                                                 
44  P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, “Copyright, contract and technology - What will remain of the public domain?”, in 
Le Droit d’auteur: un contrôle de l’accès aux oeuvres?, Cahier du CRID N°18, Bruylant, 2000, 
forthcoming.  
45  P. GOLDSTEIN, “Copyright and its substitutes”, The Kastenmeier Lecture, Wisconsin Law Review, 
1997, p. 865; ROBERT P. MERGES, “The end of friction? property rights and contract in the 
‘Newtonian’ world of on-line commerce”, 12 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, p. 118; L. LESSIG, 
“The zones of cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review, 1996, p. 1408; J. REIDENBERG, “Lex Informatica: 
The formation of information policy rules through technology”, 76 Texas Law Review, p. 553.  
46  S. PERLMUTTER, “Facts and functions of the new media situation”, General Report, ALAI 2000, 
Nordic Study Days, Stockholm, 18-20 June 2000. 
47  P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, “Copyright and Technology”, op. cit.; Bernardine Trompenaars, “Formation 
and Validity of On-Line Contracts”, in P. Bernt Hugenholtz (ed.), Copyright and Electronic Commerce, 
Kluwer Law International, London/The Hague/Boston 2000. 
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making a backup copy, and the author of a scientific article could prohibit the use of quotes 
from or reviews of her or his work. Insofar as users generally have little negotiating clout 
within the framework of electronic contracts, the signing of which - in reality a mere click - 
conditions access to the work, the enforcement of exemptions provided for in law is not 
guaranteed. 
(b)  Solution: the question of the status of exemptions 
This threat raises the basic issue of the status of exemptions. Are limitations on rights matters 
of public policy or compulsory? If so, the contract cannot admit of any waiver. Or are they 
simple options, auxiliary provisions that the wishes of the parties involved could exceed? 
A legal provision is said to be d’ordre public (a matter of public policy, and hence 
mandatory) when it touches upon the essential interests of the State or the community in 
public law, or which, in private law, lays the legal foundations for the economic or moral 
order of society. The will of the contracting parties cannot set aside mandatory legal 
provisions. Any clause seeking to waive such provisions would be ruled null and void. 
Compulsory provisions protect individual interests. A contract cannot circumvent these, 
either, but the person whose interest is thus protected could renounce them. On the other 
hand, many legal provisions are referred to as auxiliary to the extent that they merely set rules 
by default which are applied only in the absence of contractual clauses to the contrary. By 
definition, every contractual exception to this kind of rule is accepted. 
The basic question of the status of exemptions is starting to be discussed in legal 
theory.48 Whereas previously many copyright specialists looked upon exemptions as mere 
concessions granted by the author for certain uses,49 an increasing number of demands are 
being heard that exemptions be regarded as legal rules in their own right50 even, say some, as 
user’s rights. 
Law-makers have not yet ventured to rule definitively on the issue. European directives 
on software and on databases make certain exemptions compulsory, notably in the case of 
backup copies, decompilation and correction of programme errors, normal use of a database 
and retrieval of non-substantial excerpts from the base content. Any contract that disallows 
this is therefore void. Belgian law is, to our knowledge, the only national text to recognize all 
exceptions to copyright and neighbouring rights as compulsory.51 
                                                 
48  L. GUIBAULT, Document de discussion sur la question des exemptions et limitations au droit d’auteur 
et aux droits voisins à l’ère numérique, Report for the Council of Europe Group of Specialists on the 
protection of right-holders in the media field, 1998. H. TROTTER, “Contracts, copyright and pre-emption 
in a digital world”, 1 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2 (1995), <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/vlil/hardy.html>. 
49  A. LUCAS, Droit d'auteur et numérique, op. cit., p. 171.  
50  HUGENHOLTZ, “Fierce creatures ...”, op. cit.; PALLAS LOREN, op. cit., p. 21; L. GUIBAULT, op. 
cit.; TH. VINJE, “Copyright Imperilled”, E.I.P.R., 1999/4, p. 197. 
51  Article 23 bis of the Belgian law of 30 June 1994 on copyright and neighbouring rights. The Japanese and 
Mexican reports at the 1998 ALAI Study Days point out that exemptions cannot be circumvented by 
contract. But the reports do not say whether it is a matter of legislative, jurisprudential or doctrinal rule. 
H. SAITO, “Rapport national: Japon”, in Les Frontières du droit d'auteur: ses limites et exceptions, 
ALAI Study Days, op. cit., p. 297; “Rapport national: Mexique”, ibid., p. 302. 
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A debate on the status of exceptions/exemptions ought to get under way at both national 
and international levels. Belgian law notwithstanding, it seems to us that not all exceptions 
should be treated alike. If we return to the distinction we made above between different kinds 
of exemption, we can continue our thinking on the subject while recognizing a different fate 
for each kind:52 
• Exemptions conveying concern for certain fundamental freedoms through 
copyright. It was explained above that some exemptions are the result of 
fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and information, freedom of 
the press and the right to privacy. This is notably true of exemptions for parody, 
quotation, criticism, news reports or private use (the right to privacy). Because of the 
ordre public nature of the freedoms on which the exemptions are based, those 
exemptions can also only pertain to ordre public. As a result, a contract may not 
prohibit a user from exercising her or his freedom of expression. 
• Exemptions based on public interest: Exemptions confined to education and 
libraries, archives and museums, and the disabled, and exemptions required by 
justice and the State, safeguard public interests. Here, too, it strikes us as essential 
that private desires should not be able to take precedence over public interest. 
Nevertheless, copyright also stands for a key public interest as an instrument for the 
promotion and spread of culture. It is therefore indispensable to weigh competing 
interests between copyright and the interest underlying the disputed exemption in 
order to determine which takes precedence. This evaluation will not necessarily 
result in the same outcome from one State to another. As a result, it is impossible to 
make a definitive decision for or against a general solution regarding the status of 
public interest in this category of exemptions. It is, however, necessary to stress that 
the public interests of education and research deserve a special place in the context of 
the information and knowledge society. 
• Exemptions for market failure: When an exemption is exclusively based on the 
practical impossibility of enforcing copyright, and does not otherwise infringe any 
fundamental freedom or public interest, such an exemption could possibly be granted 
auxiliary status by each State. 
(c)  Recommendations 
1. States must decide on the issue of the status of exemptions. Exemptions that convey 
through copyright the concern to safeguard certain fundamental freedoms are, by 
their very nature, mandatory. As a result, a contract may not circumvent legally 
recognized exemptions. The status of exemptions based on public interest must be 
examined. 
2.  Exemptions for research, education and the transmission of knowledge must, 
because of their central place in a democratic society, be recognized as mandatory. 
 
                                                 
52  HUGENHOLTZ, P.B., “Adapting copyright to the information superhighway”, in The Future of 
Copyright in a Digital Environment, Kluwer, 1996, p. 94. See also L. GUIBAULT, op.cit. 
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3.2 Technology and copyright 
(a)  Current situation: technology in aid of copyright 
Contracts will not be enough to guarantee foolproof protection for works. Technological 
mechanisms, mainly based on cryptography, will progressively allow access and transmission 
of works to be secured and to supplement the legal protection provided by the law and the 
contract with efficient technological protection. The intention is to counter the threats of 
technology by using technology itself. This development is well illustrated by Charles Clark’s 
henceforth famous phrase, “The answer to the machine is in the machine”.53 
The technologies likely to be used by authors and other right-holders to protect their 
works and performances in the information society are extremely varied. Some have been 
specifically designed to answer the digital threat to copyright, while others have been 
developed to protect indiscriminately any kind of digital content, whether copyrighted or not. 
It is difficult to draw up a specific list of technological devices either in current use or 
being developed, just as it is impossible to predict the future of these technologies in the area 
of protecting works under copyright.54 
It is possible, however, to sort technological devices for copyright and neighbouring 
rights protection into four broad categories according to the primary purposes of these 
devices. Thus, we may distinguish between measures that efficiently protect an act falling 
under the author’s exclusive right, systems of conditional access, tools for marking and 
identification and electronic rights management systems. 
1.  Technological protection of copyright 
These are technical tools which prohibit the performance of any act or use that is the 
exclusive right of the copyright holders, such as printing, transmission to the public, digital 
copies, modifying the work, etc. Anti-copying systems are above all those whose main 
function is to prevent the making of a copy of the protected work or object, either solely 
digital or any copy whether digital or analogue. For example, the dongle, mainly used in the 
software sector, generally consists of a piece of hardware,55 a kind of key which plugs into the 
serial port of the computer. All software protected by this system then connects to this key to 
verify what the user’s rights include. The dongle principle seems like a precursor of smart 
cards, which allow a greater amount of information to be stored. Smart cards may also 
contain prepaid payment units. Unlike dongles, whose use until now has been limited to 
expensive software programs, smart cards will no doubt be used more often for software as 
well as for other works available to the general public. These two technologies aim at both 
access to and control of uses, notably that of copying. 
                                                 
53  C. CLARK, “The answer to the machine is in the machine”, in The Future of Copyright in a Digital 
Environment, op. cit., pp. 139-146. 
54  D. GERVAIS, Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identities Systems, WIPO Advisory Committee 
on Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Global Information Networks, First Session, Geneva, 
14 and 15 December 1998. 
55  It may also involve inserting a disc into the computer when the user wants to use the software. The 
software will thus only work if the disc is in the user’s possession. 
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The Serial Copy Management System is a system used mainly in the United States on 
audio-digital recording devices such as DAT and mini-discs. This technology enables the 
device to decode audio signals built into the hardware and to decode data regarding, among 
other things, its protection. The system allows one digital copy to be made from the original 
but prevents any further copying. 
2.  Systems of access 
One of the major challenges of digital networks is to make access to protected information 
and content secure, both in order to ensure payment of a fee and to protect the copyright 
covering the work that has been thus “padlocked”. Many systems have accordingly been 
developed with a view to ensuring and securing access either to a work or a collection of 
works, or to a service including among other things the works under copyright. Deactivating 
the access control device is done either by payment or when other terms of permission agreed 
with the copyright holders have been met. The access device may control only initial access 
and subsequently leave the work free for any use, or it may check on the occasion of each new 
access to make sure that the terms have been respected. Access may also be easily 
differentiated according to type of user, which is a great advantage of these systems. For 
example, a university may have gained access by paying an annual blanket fee for a work or 
group of works for use by a certain number of students and for a one-year period. In that case, 
the system will verify the existence of the decoding key on university computers or the use of 
a contractually agreed password, or the student’s identity. On the other hand, the same 
technology may grant repeated access to an individual in exchange for renewed payment: in 
proportion to frequency of use, for example. 
Technologies performing this role are many: cryptography, passwords, set-top boxes, 
black-boxes, digital signatures and digital envelope.56 The cryptography process is well 
known. It may be defined, following the example of the French law on regulating 
telecommunications, as “the transformation with the help of secret conventions of clear 
information or signals into information or signals that are unintelligible to third parties, or to 
carry out the reverse procedure by the means designed for that purpose”.57 In the digital 
world, coding and decoding are done by using algorithms of varying degrees of complexity. 
Digital signatures are a particular application of cryptography used to certify and 
identify a document.58 In the context of copyright protection, this technology is mainly used 
to secure transmissions of works over electronic networks and to prevent access to the work 
by unauthorized persons. The decoding key is provided after payment of the fee or fulfilment 
of other conditions for using the work. 
The digital envelope or digital container is an application of cryptography through 
which a work is “inserted” into a digital envelope containing information regarding the work 
and its terms of use. Only after having satisfied these terms (such as payment of a fee, use of a 
password, etc.) does the envelope actually open and the user gain access to the work. 
                                                 
56  Dongles and smart cards (see above) may also have an access control function. 
57  Law 90-1170 of 29 December 1990, O.J., 30 December 1990, p. 16439.  
58  J. HUBIN, Y. POULLET, in conjunction with B. LEJEUNE and P. VAN HOUTTE, La sécurité 
informatique, entre technique et droit, Cahier du CRID N° 14, Brussels, Story-Scientia, 1998.  
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3. Tools for marking and tattooing 
Many techniques can be used to identify and mark works.59 The techniques have various 
purposes: the main one is to serve as a visible or invisible means of inserting information 
about the work, whether it be the title of the work, the identity of its creator and the copyright 
holder, or the terms of use. 
This function will be particularly protected under Article 12 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, regarding the protection of information on rights management. Here, the concern is 
chiefly with watermarking or tattooing, which allows certain information to be discreetly 
inserted into the work’s digital code. This marking is usually invisible and inaudible. The 
invisible inscription is made by using a steganographic technique, steganography being “the 
art and science of communicating so as to conceal the communication itself”.60 The use of 
invisible ink is one example of this ancient science that was borrowed by the analogue world. 
In a digital environment, watermarking alters certain “unnecessary”61 bits of an image or a 
sound. Using an appropriate software program, this digital code may be extracted and 
deciphered. The marking is generally indelible and is to be found, even after the work has 
been modified or broken up, in every part of the work. 
However, other characteristics of these technologies provide copyright protection 
somewhat indirectly. First of all, marking is in certain cases perfectly visible; a “mark” is then 
clearly placed on the representation of the work, somewhat similarly to the way the term 
“SPECIMEN” is placed on non-circulating currency or other official papers. This practice, 
also called “fingerprinting”, is widespread enough in photographic agencies which thus apply 
their name or logo to a copy of a photograph solely for promotional purposes, and hand over 
the photo without this marking only when payment of the required fee has been made. This is 
also the case in certain museums or online archives where reproductions of the collections 
bear the seal of the museum.62 This visible watermarking fulfils, in this case, a function of 
protection against copying in that this clearly apparent marking implies a lowering of the 
value of what is accessible free of charge on the networks. 
Each separate copy of the work distributed to users may also incorporate a distinct 
digital serial number. In that case, a pirated copy later found on the market can reveal the 
original copy from which the counterfeit was made. By thus stamping each image, it is 
possible to trace unauthorized copies of the image back to the source by using a file repeating 
the serial numbers and the users to whom these stamped images have been licensed. Here the 
essential function of the protection technique is to provide proof of counterfeiting. Finally, 
                                                 
59  S. DUSOLLIER, Le droit d’auteur et son empreinte digitale, Ubiquité, N° 2, May 1999, pp. 31-47. 
60  R. LEYMONERIE, Cryptage et Droit d'auteur, Les Cahiers de la Propriété Intellectuelle, 1998, Vol. 10, 
N°2, p. 423; see also D. GUINIER, La stéganographie, De l’invisibilité des communications digitales à la 
protection du patrimoine multimédia, Expertises, June 1998, pp. 186-190. 
61  These bits are unnecessary in that the images and sounds include a large number of bits that may be 
deleted or altered without any noticeable consequence for the hearer or spectator. In the case of an audio 
recording, the digital line code for marking is incorporated into bits that remain inaudible to the human 
ear. 
62  An example is the Vatican Library, whose rare documents have been digitized and made available to the 
public online, albeit covered by the Vatican seal, which prevents their being re-utilized for commercial 
purposes. 
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one last useful function of watermarking is for the purpose of authenticating the marked 
content, notably as a guarantee that the work is present in its entirety. 
4.  Electronic management systems 
Electronic management tools are all technologies that ensure rights management over 
electronic networks by making it possible to license online utilization of works, and to 
monitor such use. These devices blend contractual and technological protection.63 
Other functions may also be included in these tools: distributing royalties, taking 
payment, sending bills, data-profiling users, etc. For example, electronic agents have recently 
appeared on the market.64 Developed to perform many tasks on electronic networks, some of 
them are programmed to negotiate and sign electronic contracts.65 This technology is also 
starting to be applied to copyright in that such contracting agents are sent out with the 
protected content on the Internet, both to display the terms and conditions of licensing and to 
receive and manage the agreement, i.e. the click, of the users. Other, more powerful, agents 
manage the distribution and use of the work completely and totally by electronic means, 
notably by incorporating a system of electronic payment, by renewing user permission, or by 
making a precise report on the use (which works were copied, printed, enlarged, downloaded? 
how many times?), both for purposes of billing that is appropriate and proportionate to the 
actual use and for later marketing (which user enjoys what kind of music?). 
Another possibility is the distribution of royalties to authors and performers and other 
copyright-holders online via such agents. When these agents merely control the utilization of 
works and keep tabs on how frequently works or websites are consulted, or even draw up 
precise profiles of the users, the term often used is metering systems. 
Finally, Electronic Rights Management Systems or ERMS are probably the 
protection measures that are most frequently spoken about, although one must be careful not 
to think of them as a specific kind of technology. The ERMS (also called ECMS for 
Electronic Copyright Management Systems) consist rather of a combination of many tools 
and technologies designed to play several roles.66 Thus, a cryptography tool blocking access 
to the work may be associated with an anti-copying system prohibiting the reproduction of the 
work even by a legitimate user. The watermarking technique (see above) and a system of 
electronic licensing and payment may also be incorporated in the same computer program. 
Generally, the main function of the ERMS is to manage uses and licences for the works 
online. We therefore place them in the category of management tools.  
                                                 
63  P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, “Copyright, contract and technology”, op. cit. 
64  R. JULIA-BARCELO, “Electronic contracts: A new legal framework for electronic contracts: the EU 
electronic commerce proposal”, C.L.S.R., 06/1999, N°15/3, pp. 147-158. 
65  S. GAUTHRONET and F. NATHAN, “On-line services and data protection and the protection of 
privacy”, A Study for the European Commission, DG XV, p. 31. 
66  M. LEDGER and J.P. TRIAILLE, Dispositions contre le contournement des provisions techniques de 
protection, in “Copyright in Cyberspace”, ALAI Study Days, Amsterdam, June 1996, Ed. ALAI, 1997. 
GERVAIS, D., Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identifier Systems, Advisory Committee on 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights in Global Information Network, Geneva, 14-15 December 
1998. VINJE, TH., “A brave new world of technical protection systems: will there still be room for 
copyright?”, E.I.P.R., 1996/8, p. 431. 
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(b)  Issue: access to the work and enjoyment of exemptions within the framework of 
technical systems 
Technical systems pay little attention to the limitations placed on copyright to ensure a certain 
balance between protection and the promotion of culture and knowledge. They are actually 
liable to padlock and to block access to works that are not, or are no longer, under copyright 
or to prevent the normal exercise of a legally recognized exception. In this case, the execution 
of copyright even goes beyond the existence and extent of the right. 
This implies that users hoping to make a reproduction or a communication to the public, 
within the limitations on sole rights, could only do so by finding a way around the 
technological barrier. The user must thus display great ingenuity and technical skill in order to 
use a work in a way that would happen naturally in a traditional non-digital environment,67 
especially since the instruments potentially available for so doing would obviously be 
sanctioned by the provisions that we shall look at below. 
We therefore think it indispensable to specify legally the limitations to technological 
protections, given their potential effect of appropriation of the public domain and of the 
restriction of access to information that they imply. Such an exercise must take place as soon 
as possible, to prevent an unlimited appropriation of things that are by their very nature or by 
law unappropriable. Let us take, for example, the case of the archives on witnesses to the 
Holocaust currently being put together by Spielberg. If he were to decide to padlock this mass 
of information by a technological protection system requiring payment of a fee, would not 
access to information, to history, and to the memory of our societies be endangered? 
The problem is similar where observance of exceptions is concerned. If, owing to a 
technological protection, the user is no longer able to quote from a work, to make a copy for 
personal, educational or informative purposes, the effect of exceptions in the digital world 
now will become purely theoretical. 
(c) Solutions and discussion 
The legitimacy of the technological barrier to the public domain, or the prevention of 
enjoyment of a copyright exemption is one of the thorniest issues to have arisen from current 
developments. One can hardly cast doubt on the justifiability of resorting to technological 
measures to secure the transmission and distribution of digital content (for example, in the 
context of electronic commerce). Such technological security has, in any event, far more to do 
with protecting the service and benefits that the distributor of cultural content provides than 
with copyright protection.68 However, this technological shield comes in addition to legal 
protection of copyright and even goes beyond it on a number of points. As a result, the 
complex balance achieved in copyright between protection and free use becomes quite 
precarious. This goes to show that, if copyright holders are right to use technology to secure 
their works, it is also right at the same time to provide legal correctives to its potential abuse. 
                                                 
67  P. SAMUELSON, “The Copyright Grab”, Wired 4.01 (1996); T. VINJE, “A brave new world of 
technical protection systems: will there still be room for copyright?”, E.I.P.R., 1996/8, p. 431; 
M. LEDGER and J.P. TRIAILLE, op. cit.; COHEN, J., “Some reflections on copyright management 
systems and laws designed to protect them”, Berk. T.L.J., Vol. 12, N° 1, 1997, p. 9. 
68  S. DUSOLLIER, Incidences et réalités d’un droit de contrôler l’accès en droit européen, in Le Droit 
d'auteur: un contrôle de l'accès aux oeuvres?, Cahier du CRID N°18, Bruylant, 2000, forthcoming. 
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A first kind of corrective may be found in common law, and notably in the principle of 
abuse of right as well as in systems of consumer protection. The application of these 
institutions to copyright is still in its early stages,69 but nothing prevents it from falling within 
its purview. 
One solution would be to make a decision about the difficult, and still rather unusual, 
question of the status of exemptions that we spoke about earlier (if an exemption pertains to 
ordre public, any act making its exercise impossible is prohibited). This solution is, however, 
imperfect at best. Technology is indeed blind and reacts only to the demands of technological 
acts such as copying, printing, sending, reading or access. It cannot recognize the framework 
within which these acts are performed. The often subjective terms imposed for the exercise of 
an exception cannot be analysed or recognized by such technological measures. One example 
is the compulsory character granted by the European directive on databases to the exception 
allowing the legitimate user to perform the acts necessary for normal use. But how could the 
technological measure protecting the database determine what “normal” use is? 
Likewise, an equally compulsory exemption is granted to the user of a protected 
database by a sui generis right which allows unsubstantial parts of it to be retrieved. The 
system protecting the base cannot, however, define what an “unsubstantial” part is, unless it 
has been programmed to do so by the copyright holder, which would take away part of the 
exemption’s purpose. 
Another solution may be found in contractual relationships between copyright holders 
and users. The authors could thus find themselves constrained to provide certain kinds of 
users with a copy of the work without any technological protection, or a copy whose 
technological protection would take into account the kind of exemption to which that user was 
entitled. This solution would, however, concern only certain broad categories of users such as 
libraries, journalists, researchers and teachers, who benefit from specific exemptions. These 
various alternatives would penalize individual users, who would not be granted such an 
opportunity. The system of exemptions would then become nothing more than a matter of 
negotiating a contract between the copyright holders and certain users who might be dubbed 
collective users. 
The proposed European directive imposes a particularly complex solution,70 in that the 
Member States must actually take the necessary steps to ensure that copyright holders allow 
users to take advantage of the exemptions. The directive does not specify how this 
opportunity will be guaranteed, other than in the case of conventions agreed upon between 
copyright holders and certain users. It is hard to see how authors could agree to such an 
obligation. Nevertheless, this provision does not apply to works made available to the public 
over digital networks by contract, which considerably narrows its scope. 
Nor does American law directly resolve the issue. Over a two-year period, the Library 
of Congress and the Register of Copyright will review the effects of technological measures 
on the exercise of fair use.71 However, the consequences of this review are rather 
insignificant, as it will be a matter of exempting certain categories of work from the legal 
                                                 
69  L. GUIBAULT, “Limitations found outside copyright law,” op. cit. 
70  Article 6(4) of the common position of 8 June 2000.  
71  J. GINSBURG,  “News from US”, RIDA, January 1999; pp. 147 et seq.  
27 
  S.Dusollier-Y.Poullet-M.Buydens           Copyright and Access to Information 
  
 A Study for UNESCO  
 
17 July 2000 
 
 
protection of the technological measures that we shall examine below; but the legitimacy of 
the technological measures themselves will not be questioned. 
This solution could nevertheless inspire the creation of an International Observatory to 
consider the effects of introducing technological measures into copyright protection on access 
to information and the public domain, as well as on the exercise of limitations on copyright. It 
is in fact difficult to determine at the present time what kinds of safeguards on the system are 
needed, as in practice these technologies are still not very widely used. It would be wiser to 
observe the consequences of these developments in an ongoing manner. Such an Observatory 
must necessarily be created at international level, because the distribution of the works and of 
protective technologies will be made on a worldwide scale. UNESCO seems to offer a 
particularly appropriate framework within which to set up such an Observatory. 
(d)  Recommendations 
1.  The use of technological mechanisms to protect digital works is open to abuse, 
and the necessity of dealing with such abuse needs to be asserted. Placing 
technological locks on elements in the public domain fundamentally threatens 
access to those works and cannot, in principle, be accepted. 
2. Reflection on the status of exemptions must examine the consequences of that 
status for the use of technological measures. 
3. Technological measures are acceptable only insofar as they take into account 
and allow for the observance of certain exceptions to and limitations on 
copyright. 
4. With the aim of fulfilling their basic role of spreading knowledge in the digital 
world, libraries and teaching institutions must benefit from copies of works 
unencumbered by technological protection preventing reasonable access to the 
legitimately acquired work. 
5. An International Observatory to consider the effects of introducing technological 
measures into copyright protection on access to information and to the public 
domain, and on the exercise of limitations on copyright, could be set up under 
the aegis of UNESCO. 
 
 3.3 Legal protection of technological systems 
(a) Current situation: Article 11 of the WIPO Treaty and national legislation 
The development of technological measures placed on works has brought about the birth of a 
new intellectual property right which protects this technology against illegitimate use, 
impairment or destruction. The goal of this legal provision is to compensate for the fallibility 
of the technology itself. Technological measures can in fact be neutralized, or “hacked”, and a 
market for illicit devices, like the pirate decoders which allow the decoding of certain private 
television channels, could grow. 
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At the 1996 Diplomatic Conference, WIPO member countries were unable to agree on a 
detailed system of protection for technological measures used to protect copyright and 
neighbouring rights. The text of the Treaty asks States to provide legal protection “against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with 
the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in 
respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law”. Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty make no mention whatsoever of how such protection is to be set up,72 nor 
which specific acts ought to be prohibited. Total freedom is given to the States on this point, 
which implies that national provisions run the risk of being at odds with them, even if, upon 
inspection, the American and European models seem to have inspired other law-makers.73  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides for a threefold coverage of 
technological measures.74 First, neutralizing technological measures controlling access to a 
work is penalized. Second, marketing, manufacture and promotion of devices allowing such 
neutralization is prohibited. Finally, a similar prohibition covers devices allowing the 
neutralization of measures preventing the performance of certain acts that require the author’s 
permission (mainly anti-copying measures). The area of technologies concerned is thus very 
broad because it covers both mechanisms that protect copyright, such as the right to 
reproduce, to communicate or to distribute, and measures that control access to the work, a 
prerogative that is not specifically included in the author’s exclusive rights. 
The proposed European Directive, currently at the common position stage, also aims 
both at the act of neutralization and at so-called preparatory activities, i.e. the manufacture 
and commercialization of illicit devices. The measures protected are defined as “any 
technique, device or element that, in a normal context of use, is designed to prevent or 
prohibit the violation of any copyright or neighbouring right such as defined by law or sui 
generis right”. 
 At first glance, this targets only the technical devices that prevent or limit the 
performance of acts over which the author has an exclusive monopoly, i.e. the right to 
reproduction or to communication, and also the author’s moral right. 
On the other hand, it is specified, in accordance with the text of the WIPO Treaties, that 
only effective devices will be protected, this effectiveness being defined in such a way that it 
also covers the systems of access to the works. Indeed, “technological measures are said to be 
effective when the use of a work or that of another protected object is controlled by applying 
an access code or any other type of protective process which achieves this goal of protection 
operationally and reliably with the permission of the copyright holders”. 
                                                 
72  S. DUSOLLIER,  “Electrifying the fence: the legal protection of technological measures for protecting 
copyright”, E.I.P.R., 1999/6, pp. 285-297. 
73  For an analysis of American, European and Australian provisions, see S. DUSOLLIER and 
A. STROWEL, La protection légale des systèmes techniques, Workshop on Implementation Issues of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Geneva, 
6-7 December 1999. 
74  J. GINSBURG, “News from US”, R.I.D.A., January 1999; pp. 146 et seq.; P. SAMUELSON, “Intellectual 
property and the digital economy: why the anti-circumvention regulations need to be revised”, Berk. 
Tech. L.J., 1999, vol. 14, p. 519. 
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Both access technologies and systems narrowly protecting exclusive rights are covered 
by this protection. 
Australia and Japan have enacted similar protection for systems controlling access to 
works.75 
(b)  Issue: desirability of a third level of protection 
Legal protection of technological measures is sometimes presented as a third level of the 
protection of works. The first level or “layer” is copyright law which provides general 
protection. Technological measures can be compared to a second level of protection or a 
second “layer” in that they provide technical protection of the work (or control of access to 
the work). Finally, Article 11 of the WIPO Treaties cleared the way for a third level of 
protection, as it sets up protection of the technological measure: thus, the work is henceforth 
protected both by law and by technology, and the technology itself is protected as such by 
law. 
As a result, the user who performs an act requiring permission from the author relating 
to a work protected by a technological system commits two offences: one against copyright, 
and the other against provisions regarding technological measures. 
The consequences of this are sometimes absurd. Let us suppose that a user neutralizes 
the technological barrier that prevents digital copying of the work. As a result, she or he can 
be sued for copyright infringement. Why add an extra penalty for neutralizing the protective 
mechanism? 
On the other hand, a user may neutralize the lock in order to perform an act of 
authorized copying, for example taking advantage of an exception, or to have access to the 
work without, once having accessed it, performing acts requiring permission from copyright 
holders. She or he can also neutralize the lock in order, for example, to access a work in the 
public domain or unprotected informational content. In so doing, the user commits no 
infringement of copyright but remains liable for the mere neutralization of the technological 
measure. Simple access, if it takes place as the result of having violated security measures, 
becomes illicit. 
At first glance, copyright does not regulate access to information. In the analogue 
environment, access to the work by the public and its consultation require no permission from 
the author.76 Reading a book, watching a film, attending a show, looking at works of art, does 
not generally involve any act covered by copyright. On the other hand, it goes without saying 
that the authorizations required for exploitation of the work, such as for a museum exhibition, 
printing a manuscript, distributing a film for cinema showing or putting on a play, have 
certainly been duly requested by the exploiter, upstream of the final use of the work. 
The existence of such protection of access through technological measures is rife with 
consequences. For example, a video game could be sold on a CD-ROM incorporating a 
technological protection against access. The wholly legitimate purchaser of the game could 
                                                 
75  See A. STROWEL and S. DUSOLLIER, op. cit. 
76  J. LITMAN, “The exclusive right to read”, Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1994, p. 42; S. DUSOLLIER, 
“Incidences et réalités d’un droit d’accès ...”, op. cit. 
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later find a technological barrier raised, either after several games or because she or he is not 
playing the game on a device of the same brand, or because the game upgrades have not been 
purchased. If players try to deactivate the technological protection, they are committing an 
offence. 
This extension of the author’s monopoly over access to the work cannot fail to seem 
surprising. We can only wonder about the real reason for protecting such measures. Is it 
actually copyright whose exercise and effectiveness are thus strengthened? Or is not the real 
purpose to protect the investment made in developing and using technological devices? 
Is it not rather for the simple distribution of content, possibly protected by copyright, 
and its remuneration that the protection is mainly designed? In the example of the video 
game, it may be accepted that the distributor or manufacturer contractually imposes terms of 
acquisition of the product, such as a limited price for a certain number of uses or the 
obligation to play the game on a certain piece of equipment. This being said, these terms 
placed on the purchase and use of works do not fall within the domain of copyright. The video 
game fan who wants to access the game in order to use it performs no act covered by 
copyright, unless, of course, she or he makes a temporary copy, which would generally be 
covered by an exception. If the simple fact of crossing the barrier is prohibited, whether the 
acts performed later are legal or not, is it not essentially the barrier itself which is being 
protected? To quote Y. Gendreau: “The change has taken place quickly. It is also paradoxical: 
although it is not yet known just what acts are covered by the right of reproduction, within the 
context of copyright exorbitant systems of traditional copyright are being constructed to 
monitor those acts.”77 
(c)  Discussion 
Each level of protection of works ought to reflect the essential balance between monopoly and 
access to information. That balance, present in copyright, must also be carried over to 
technological measures and to the latter’s legal protection. 
By and large, it seems to us that the consequences of the intervention of technology in 
the distribution of works remain uncertain. Before the market has even developed efficient 
and widely used systems, those systems are already protected. Is this not premature? Ought 
one not first to let the market develop before answering a need for protection that may not 
exist? The technology still seems to be at too embryonic a stage to require protection quite so 
soon. 
Common law furthermore allows for reasonable protection of the technological 
measures through legislation on computer crime or unfair competition, or the protection of 
systems of conditional access to audiovisual services. This common law responds adequately 
to the demand of the WIPO Treaties for effective legal protection. WIPO also confirms78 that 
Article 11 of the Treaty does not oblige Member States to set up specific legal protection if 
the existing legislative framework reasonably satisfies the need for protection.79 
                                                 
77  Y. GENDREAU, “The Reproduction Right and the Internet,” RIDA, January 1999, p. 54. 
78  Kurt Kemper, remarks at the Workshop on implementation issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), 6-7 December 1999, Geneva. 
79  Cf. A. LUCAS, Droit d’auteur et numérique, op. cit. pp. 273 et seq. 
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The question must here be approached differently for the two branches of protection 
that States generally grant to technological measures under copyright: on the one hand, the act 
of neutralization; on the other, preparatory activities such as manufacturing and distributing 
products or services that make neutralization possible. 
1.  The desirability of prohibiting neutralization 
Technological measures to protect works have generally sought to dissuade users from 
performing illicit acts. Normal users will not attempt to break through the technological 
protection, mainly because the fact of the lock itself dissuades them from violating the work. 
If the technological protection is removed, the user may have to answer for an act of 
copyright infringement. This sanction strikes us as adequate. Tacking on an ad hoc sanction 
adds nothing, and indeed would be a mechanism for the protection of investment, which 
cannot, in our opinion, be justified under the heading of intellectual property. 
The ambiguity maintained by legislation on the issue of neutralizing technological 
measures for the sole purpose of making a reproduction covered by a copyright exception 
raises questions about its actual relevance. The question of exceptions interfering with, and 
placing limitations on, copyright, and of the legal protection of technological measures, is one 
of the most complex in this field. We saw earlier that a technological measure can strongly 
inhibit a user’s ability to perform acts that a legal exception allows. The user may then be 
tempted to unlock the work in order to take normal advantage of the exemption to which she 
or he has a right. 
The user who does so will be liable to prosecution, even though she or he has performed 
no act covered by copyright. The WIPO Treaties seem to limit the sanction to cases where a 
violation of copyright is performed after deactivating a technological barrier, but national 
laws are less clear on this point. 
We have also seen that the protection of these technologies generally covers access 
systems. States or regional bodies, such as the European Union, have as a rule introduced or 
passed laws aimed not only at the technologies protecting copyright proper, but also 
technologies bearing on and controlling access to the works. This is apparent in the American 
and Australian laws, and is also clear in the definition of technological measures repeated in 
the European proposal. As a result, the technological locking of access to a work is protected 
to the extent that circumventing it is prohibited, which sets up a de facto protection of access 
to the work, control over which would thus become a prerogative of the copyright holder but 
without this having been foreseen by the law. It is true that the large majority of the 
technological systems currently in use for protecting works are cryptography-based measures, 
whose main purpose is to prevent unauthorized access to encoded contents. Merely accessing 
a work by removing a technological barrier, however, even though no act covered by 
copyright were to be performed once inside, would be an offence. 
Concern to protect technologies relating to access is perfectly understandable. However, 
it is more a question of protection of access to the service providing the works, and especially 
protection of the service’s remuneration. It is thus more a matter of preoccupation with the 
exploiter or the distributor of the works than a direct protection of the copyright holders. The 
interest protected through the legal sanction of technological measures is tied to the 
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distribution of works over networks and to the security of electronic commerce. That interest 
undoubtedly deserves protection, such as, for example, that provided by the European 
directive on conditional access, which sanctions only preparatory activities, i.e. manufacturing 
and distributing devices that make it possible to neutralize access systems. But it must be 
recognized that such protection cannot be justified by considerations of intellectual property. 
Here it is a matter of protecting access to a service, whether it includes protected works or 
not. This displacement of the basis for technological and legal protection ought at least to be 
the subject of further debate, for there is a risk that copyright law could be turned into a 
general law on computer security.80 
These two points adequately demonstrate that making the circumvention of 
technological measures an illicit act under copyright would be tantamount to setting up a new 
protection for a simple technological barrier, without considering the legitimacy itself of the 
acts performed by the user once the barrier has been unlocked. 
2.  The desirability of making  preparatory activities illegal 
Techniques used to protect works on electronic networks are no different from other security 
mechanisms relating to other types of content. For example, cryptography will serve as much 
to protect works as to protect television broadcasts or the forwarding of financial or personal 
data. As a result, the provisions supposed to neutralize them will also do so indiscriminately. 
Given this fact, protection for general technologies of access to digital content could be 
more useful than a specific protection for copyright. This protection actually exists in some 
countries in the legislation on audiovisual products (provisions regarding conditional access) 
or in computer crime law. Protecting conditional access seems to us adequately to fulfil the 
need for protection requested by WIPO. 
Furthermore, the issue of public access to certain content has always been central to 
audiovisual law, from which provisions regarding conditional access derive. For example, 
under a European directive on conditional access, the possibility was mentioned of obliging 
service providers to guarantee free access to certain events said to be of major importance to 
society, following the example of what the “Television Without Frontiers” directive calls for, 
notably regarding sporting events. It is difficult to think in such terms within the framework 
of copyright, which tends to defend itself with exceptions laid down by law to ensure access 
to information. 
(d)  Recommendations 
1. Protection of technological measures must be sought in common law, and not in 
copyright. 
2.  The act of neutralizing technological measures cannot be sanctioned by 
copyright. Sanctions relating to the violation of copyright are enough in this 
case to sanction the user if necessary. 
                                                 
80  P. SAMUELSON, “Intellectual property and the digital economy: why the anti-circumvention regulations 
need to be revised”, Berk. Tech. L.J., 1999, vol. 14, p. 519. 
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3. Prohibiting the manufacture and marketing of devices designed to neutralize 
technological measures is a means of protection belonging to computer security. 
Sanction for such activities must be sought in computer crime law or 
audiovisual law, particularly as regards conditional access systems. 
4. Any legal protection regime for technological measures must be carried out with 
due regard for access to information and to the public domain, and must permit 
the legitimate exercise of copyright exemptions. 
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As early as 1994, the authors of the “A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age”81 conceived of 
two possible models of development: the first, known as the “cyberspace” model, 
corresponded to the wishes of the protagonists who started the Internet. It was about the free 
circulation of information and free expression. The second, called the “Information 
Superhighways” model, envisaged the development of tools to control access to information. 
Thus, technology fluctuates between two worlds: that of freedom and that of property. 
Of course, the former model is mainly Utopian and misunderstands the very principle of 
literary and artistic property. Technical protections that are added to an unprecedented 
extension both in the content and in the items protected by intellectual property rights lend 
credence to the idea that the market has undeniably preferred the latter approach. 
Our statement, in answer to the aforementioned developments, seeks to (re)establish the 
balance between, on the one hand, the fair and legitimate claim to protecting the legitimate 
interests of authors and producers of content and, on the other, the need to safeguard the 
interests of each individual and of the public in general in benefiting from technological 
progress which offers a unique opportunity to allow everyone better access to the common 
heritage of humanity. 
This is the sense in which we clearly plead for a return to the kind of balance that is the 
very essence of copyright. “All the copyright, and nothing but the copyright”, as we might put 
it. 
That phrase means: 
-  That it is important that the domain of protection of intellectual property rights be 
confined to “creations” or to “technological innovations” but exclude the investments 
made and the technological measures introduced for their protection. Any other 
solution would be prejudicial to developing countries and to the non-commercial 
sector, particularly to libraries and institutions of learning; 
- That it is useful to reassert the principles underlying exceptions to intellectual 
property rights, to reconsider the current list using these principles as a yardstick, or 
even to add new exceptions, and finally to safeguard their compulsory character. It is 
particularly important for UNESCO that exceptions for scientific, educational and 
journalistic purposes be maintained; 
-  That it is indispensable to safeguard the universal right to access to the 
“informational public domain” which brings together the information essential for 
the citizen of a modern democratic society (statistical, regulatory, environmental and 
safety-related information) and which each State must control without risk of 
confiscation of that control by private companies; 
                                                 
81  “Cyberspace and the American dream: a Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age,” Infoways, 1995, p. 2. 
Cf. the conclusions reached by C. LAMOULINE and Y. POULLET, Des autoroutes de l'information à la 
démocratie électronique, Report prepared for the Council of Europe, October 1995, Bruylant, Nemesis, 
Brussels, 1996, pp. 75 et seq. 
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-  Finally, that, considering the development of technological measures of protection, it 
is urgent to recall that the intellectual property right is not designed to legitimize 
measures of control over access; that, if these must be protected by common law, 
proper protection must be found, independent of copyright, in the regulation of 
product distribution, i.e. the service of providing conditional access to those 
products, which will thus no longer be able to jeopardize the desired balance between 
the interests of the copyright holders and societal or public interests - a balance that 
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